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TABi AUTHORITIES 
STATEMENT Ul« ^ d UKlbDICTION 
Rule 3 (i f tlllii" Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure confers 
jurisdiction with the above-entitled Court" . 
STATEMENT OF 1UBUUU 
Issue #1: 
Did the .ewe :ourr err ^on^ludinn f-^^^ ,^-,^ fM-<- i *^ ^ 
. *- - » i 
accoun; .^^ - i.sbursing such proceeds thereof, Appellant: Vi ctor 
Lawrence, hereafter Appellant Lawrence, had engaged in xcjal 
>e xv^» * ^nciuaiiig that * ^ r ^ ' m u viuiur 
i nartips in ^^t.on to +->*» 
proceeds .•; • ,ie personal jniun action trvit he had the obligation 
zeroise due diligence to discover the sciiiu1 
Did +"h^  -^*~ -ourt err in deny i nq Appol 1 • 1111 iMiwr'pnr^'s iii1 1 i n 
• it il nil ii directed verdict
 p uL tlie conclusion oi 
H e e ' s case in chief, inasmuch as Appellee's only claim to any 
proceeds wap ^urp^rted ^ nave arisen frnnii III V.s i ii n rur»111 ill 
"en executed by i m I J .iiiJ 
Appellant LoweiI Summerhays? 
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All three of the aforementioned issues were addressed in the 
proceedings below. See Record at 262, 265-8, 326-32. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC, 
Rule 1.13 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, set forth in 
the addendum. 
The "Scope" of the Rules of Professional Conduct, set forth in 
the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involved a dispute between the Appellee and the 
above-named Appellants. The Appellee claimed to have provided 
chiropractic services to a certain John Ward. An Assignment of 
Benefits and a Doctor's Lien was executed by Mr. Ward and his 
attorney of record, Appellant Summerhays. Said documents were 
executed in favor of "Spine Institute." 
A settlement check was later received and deposited in the 
trust account of Appellant Lawrence. The total proceeds thereof 
were later disbursed to Mr. Ward and Appellant Summerhays. 
Appellee filed a complaint as Plaintiff in the lower court 
seeking relief for promissory estoppel, fraud, malpractice, and 
money had and received. The first twp causes of action were 
subsequently dismissed as against Appellant Lawrence. See record 
at 1-12, 50-52. 
Appellee subsequently was granted leave to amend its 
complaint. It sought for relief under additional claims of breach 
of third-party beneficiary contract, and breach of express and 
implied contract. See record at 128. 
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Subsequently during the trial on this matter Appellee and 
Appellant Summerhays stipulated to the dismissal of Appellant 
Summerhays. See record at 140-41. 
The lower court entered findings and amended findings against 
Appellant Lawrence. It concluded that when Appellant Lawrence 
endorsed the settlement check, deposited the same in his trust 
account, and disbursed the proceeds thereof, he engaged in legal 
representation of Mr. Ward. It concluded further that Appellant 
Lawrence had a legal duty to third parties in relation to the 
proceeds of the personal injury action. Judgment was awarded to 
Appellee against Appellant Lawrence. See record at 197-200, 192-
93. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Dr. Brian Burns treated John Ward in May of 1990. 
2. An Assignment of Benefits and a Doctor's Lien were 
executed by Mr. Ward and his attorney of record, Appellant 
Summerhays in favor of "Spine Institute." See record at 9-10. 
3. In the latter part of 1991, the personal injury action of 
Mr. Ward was settled. Appellant Summerhays negotiated that 
settlement with the insurance company and instructed the insurance 
company to make a check payable to Appellant Lawrence and Mr. Ward. 
See record at 197-98. 
4. In September, 1991, Appellant Lawrence initiated a call 
to Appellant Summerhays. Appellant Summerhays and Appellant 
Lawrence discussed the value of the personal injury claim of Mr. 
Ward. Appellant Summerhays told Appellant Lawrence that Dr. Burns 
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had a lien against the settlement proceeds and informed Appellant 
Lawrence of Appellant Summerhays' attorney's fees. See record at 
197-98. 
5. In December of 1991, Appellant Lawrence, Appellant 
Summerhays, and Mr. Ward met in Appellant Lawrence's office. The 
meeting was arranged by Appellant Summerhays. At that meeting, 
Appellant Lawrence and Mr. Ward endorsed the settlement check. See 
record at 197-98. 
6. Appellant Summerhays instructed Appellant Lawrence and 
Mr. Ward to endorse the settlement check and instructed Appellant 
Lawrence to deposit that check. After the check cleared, Appellant 
Summerhays instructed Appellant Lawrence to distribute the proceeds 
of the settlement, 38% to Appellant Summerhays and the balance to 
Mr. Ward. See record at 197-98. 
7. The insurance check was issued as full settlement of the 
personal injury claim of Mr. Ward. See record at 197-98. 
8. In compliance with the instructions of Appellant 
Summerhays, Appellant Lawrence deposited the checks into his trust 
account and distributed the sums to Mr. Ward and Appellant 
Summerhays. Appellant Lawrence received no compensation from 
either the settlement check, Mr. Ward, or Appellant Summerhays. 
See record at 197-98. 
9. Dr. Burns was never paid for any claim which he may have 
had against the aforementioned proceeds. See record at 197-98. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The lower court erroneously concluded that by endorsing a 
settlement check, depositing the same in a trust account, and 
disbursing such proceeds thereof, Appellant Lawrence had engaged in 
legal representation of Mr. Ward. 
From there the court concluded that once engaged in legal 
representation Appellant Lawrence had a duty to third parties, to 
ferret out claims of such third parties, to satisfy them and/or 
hold proceeds until any dispute has been resolved. 
The Appellee made these claims and the lower court granted 
such relief even though there was never any legal standard shown to 
have existed, and there was never any evidence presented to show 
even that any claim had in fact been perfected. 
Additionally, any claims purported to have existed by Appellee 
against Appellant Lawrence arose out of a Doctor's Lien. That 
Doctor's Lien, however, was in the name of and for the benefit of 
"Spine Institute", who was never a party to this action. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT 
BY ENDORSING A SETTLEMENT CHECK, DEPOSITING 
THE SAME IN A TRUST ACCOUNT, AND DISBURSING 
SUCH PROCEEDS THEREOF, APPELLANT LAWRENCE HAD 
ENGAGED IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MR. WARD. 
It is clear that Appellant Lawrence did not represent Mr. Ward 
in any legal capacity prior to his involvement of or by endorsing 
the aforementioned settlement check. Nonetheless, the lower court 
concluded that by the very act of endorsing a settlement check, 
depositing the same in one's trust account, and disbursing the 
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proceeds thereof, Appellant Lawrence had engaged in legal 
representation of Mr. Ward. 
From there the lower court concluded that, having engaged in 
legal representation of Mr. Ward, Appellant Lawrence was then under 
a legal duty to third parties in relation to the proceeds of the 
personal injury action. These duties included that he exercise due 
diligence to discover and satisfy third-party claims on the 
proceeds from the personal injury action and that he disburse 
portions of the personal injury recovery to third parties to 
satisfy their claims or to hold those sums in trust in the event 
the third-party claims were disputed. 
Appellee successfully argued that Rule 1.13 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct was dispositive in this regard. A thorough 
review of said rule and the comments thereafter, however, shows 
clearly that although a lawyer ". . . may have a duty under 
applicable law to protect such third-party claims . . ..H1 no 
applicable law was ever shown to have existed before the lower 
court. Further, the comment itself states that there are 
situations where a lawyer does not render legal services, such as 
serving as an escrow agent.2 That very argument was raised and 
improperly ignored by the lower court. See record at 262-63. 
Further the scope of those rules do not rise to the level of 
creating even a presumption that any legal duty has been breached. 
1
 Rule 1.13, Comment, Rules of Professional Conduct, a copy 
of which is included in the addendum and incorporated 
herein. 
2
 Id 
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Relevant language is contained under the caption of "Scope" of said 
rules, stating as follows. 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of 
action, nor should it create any presumption that a legal 
duty has been breached. The Rules are designed to 
provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure 
for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. 
They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted 
when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural 
weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a 
lawyer's self-assessment or for sanctioning a lawyer 
under the administration of a disciplinary authority does 
not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding 
or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the 
Rule. (Emphasis added) See "Scope" of the rules of 
Professional Conduct, a copy of which is included in the 
addendum and incorporated herein. 
And if Appellant Lawrence did not in fact engage in legal 
representation of Mr. Ward, then it only stands to reason that he 
could not have been found to have held a legal duty to any third 
parties in relation to those proceeds. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Appellant 
Lawrence did in fact hold such a legal duty to third parties, that 
duty can only be the exercise of due diligence, which is exactly 
what Appellant Lawrence did. 
No liens were perfected, no evidence was even presented to the 
lower court in an effort to show that somehow Dr. Burns' lien was 
perfected. 
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT 
LAWRENCE'S NOTION TO DISMISS, OR FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT, AT THE CONCLUSION OP 
PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
Appellee's only claim in the court below was that it had a 
contractual right to the proceeds of any personal injury settlement 
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received on behalf of or relative to Mr. Ward. It claimed that 
this right arose from the Assignment of Benefits and the Doctor's 
Lien which were both executed by Mr. Ward and Appellant Summerhays. 
There is no dispute that if Appellee had no rights against Mr. 
Ward or Appellant Summerhays it in no way could claim a right 
against Appellant Lawrence. 
Nonetheless, after Appellee concluded its case in chief 
Appellant Lawrence moved the court to dismiss Appellee's claims 
inasmuch as they appeared not to be the real party (ies) in 
interest. The Doctor's Lien were between "Spine Institute" and Mr. 
Ward and/or Appellant Summerhays. 
There was absolutely no testimony presented or received 
showing any relationship between the Appellee and "Spine 
Institute". It was only after the motion was made that Appellee's 
counsel even attempted to proffer testimony showing a nexus between 
the two entities. The lower court denied appellant's motion even 
though it was clearly against the weight of the evidence. Indeed, 
there was absolutely no evidence in any way showing that Appellee, 
Brian D. Burns D.C., d/b/a Burns Chiropractic Clinic, had any 
rights to or benefits from the aforementioned Doctor's Lien.3 
The lower court somehow concluded that, because the name 
"Brian Burns, D.C. Chiropractic Physician" appeared on the 
letterhead of the Spine Institute of Utah, it was enough to allow 
Appellee the relief requested. In its reasoning it stated that Dr. 
A copy of said Doctor's Lien is included in the addendum 
and incorporated herein. 
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Burns had provided chiropractic services and therefore he was the 
real party in interest. 
Such reasoning, however, is fallacious. A "Robert E. Morrow, 
M.D." also appears on said Doctor's Lien as an orthopedic surgeon. 
The lower court capriciously ignored that and allowed Appellee to 
sue. The court completely ignored the clear weight of the 
evidence. There was absolutely no evidence showing who has a right 
to sue on behalf of Spine Institute. There is absolutely no place 
in the record below showing that Appellee is in fact "Spine 
Institute11, or has any assignment from Spine Institute, or any 
right to maintain the lawsuit on Spine Institute's behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred when it held that Appellant Lawrence had 
engaged in legal representation of Mr. Ward. It erred further when 
it held that through such legal representation Appellant Lawrence 
had a duty to third parties, to ferret out their claims and to 
satisfy them. 
There was no evidence even presented below to show that any 
lien was in fact perfected. It appears to have been only through 
the court's erroneous interpretation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct that the court declared that civil liability arose, even 
though that is clearly beyond the scope of such rules. 
Finally, Appellee presented their entire case, but failed to 
produce any evidence that Appellee was in fact in any way related 
to, or had an assignment from, Spine Institute, the only party who 
could even remotely make an argument that it held a lien against 
11 
Mr. Ward and Appellant Summerhays and therefore vicariously against 
Appellant Lawrence. 
This Court is respectfully requested to reverse the lower 
court's decision and deny Appellee its judgment for $2,992.33 
against Appellant Lawrence. 
DATED this /£>"** day of -y> ^ ^ ^ c / 19 ?& . 
awrence, Esq., 
ing as Pro Se 
ellant/Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
brief was hand delivered to the following on this Zo^ day of 
^^^w,<^cy 19 <>c : 
Ralph C. Petty, Esq., 
Attorney for Appellee/Plaintiff 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
t?s~ 
a: RACA. brf /home#1 /f I ash/nukei t/*** 
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ADDENDUM 
14 
iuyt> RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 
COMMENT 
A lawyer should hold property of others with 
the care required of a professional fiduciary. 
Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, 
except when some other form of safekeeping is 
warranted by special circumstances. All prop-
erty which is the property of clients or third 
persons should be kept separate from the law-
yer's business and personal property and, if 
monies, in one or more trust accounts. Sepa-
rate trust accounts may be warranted when 
administering estate monies or acting in simi-
lar fiduciary capacities. 
Lawyers often receive funds from third par-
ties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If 
there is risk tha t the client may divert the 
funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not 
required to remit the portion from which the 
fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not 
hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the 
lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of 
the funds should be kept in trust, and the law-
yer should suggest means for prompt resolu-
tion of the dispute, such as arbitration. The 
undisputed portion of the funds shall be 
promptly distributed. 
Third parties, such as a client's creditors, 
may have just claims against funds or other 
property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyor may 
have a duty under applicable law to protect 
such third-party claims against wrongful inter-
ference by the client and accordingly may re-
fuse to surrender the property to the client. 
However, a lawyer should not unilaterally as-
sume to arbitrate a dispute between the client 
and the third party. 
The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule 
are independent of those arising from activity 
other than rendering legal services. For exam-
ple, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is 
governed by the applicable law relating to fidu-
ciaries even though the lawyer does not render 
legal services in the transaction. 
A "client's security fund" provides a means 
through the collective efforts of the Bar to re-
imburse persons who have lost money or prop-
erty as a result of dishonest conduct of a law-
yer. Where such a fund has been established, a 
lawyer should participate. 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 9-102(A) 
provided that "funds of clients" are to be kept 
in an identifiable bank account in the state in 
which the lawyer's office is situated. DR 
9-102Q3X2) provided that a lawyer shall "iden-
tify and label securities and properties of a cli-
ent . . . and place them in . . . safekeeping . . . ." 
DR 9-102(B)(3) required that a lawyer "main-
tain complete records of all funds, securities, 
and other properties of a client . . . ." Rule 
1.13(a) extends these requirements to property 
of a third person that is in the lawyer's posses-
sion in connection with the representation. 
Paragraph (b) is substantially similar to DR 
9-102(B)(l), (3) and (4). 
Paragraph (c) is similar to DR 9-102(A)(2), 
except that the requirement regarding dis-
putes applies to property concerning which an 
interest is claimed by a third person as well as 
by a client. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Attorney's assertion of retaining 
lien as violation of ethical code or rules govern-
ing professional conduct, 69 A.L.R.4th 974. 
Rule 1.14. Declining or Terminating Representation. 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has com-
menced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
(1) The representation will result in violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct or other law; 
(2) The lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the 
lawyer's ability to represent the client; or 
(3) The lawyer is discharged. 
(b) A lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be 
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client or 
if: 
(1) The client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's ser-
vices that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; 
(2) The client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or 
fraud; 
(3) A client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer con-
siders repugnant or imprudent; 
(4) The client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer 
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning 
that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; 
and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other 
adjudicative officer or arbitrator. 
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with 
which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue repre-
sentation in the matter unless: 
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the 
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to en-
able it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule. 
(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbi-
tration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party. 
COMMENT 
This Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge 
term "personally and substantial 1/' signifies had previously exercised remote or incidental 
that a judge who was a member of a administrative responsibility that did not af-
multimember court and thereafter left judicial fect the merits. Compare the Comment to Rule 
office to practice law is not prohibited from
 L 1 1 > ^ e t g ^ "adjudicative officer" includes 
representing a client in a matter pending in
 8 U c h 0Slcials as judges pro tempore, referees, 
the court but in which the former judge did not
 i a I m a s t e r 8 > h e a r i n g o { f l c e r g ^ d o t h e r 
participate. So also the fact that a former judge
 p a r a j u d i c i a l o f f l c e r 3 ^ a l g 0 l a w y e r 8 w h o 
exercised administrative responsibility m a
 g e r v e ^ ^ . ^ e j u d 
court does not prevent the former judge from ° 
CODE COMPARISON 
Paragraph (a) is substantially similar to DR that "a lawyer (who) has undertaken to act as 
9-10KA), which provided that a lawyer "shall an impartial arbitrator or mediator . . . should 
not accept private employment in a matter
 n o t thereafter represent in the dispute any of 
upon the merits of which he has acted in a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 D R 9 .10l(A) did not per-judicial capacity. Paragraph (a) differs, how-
 w a i y e r d e i f i c a t i o n applied to 
ever, in that it is broader in scope and states - . , . \ - . .
 x. yr 
more specifically the persons to whom it ap- f o r m e r Ju d^e s by consent of the parties. How-
plies. There was no counterpart in the Code to ev*r» D R 5-105(0 was similar m effect and 
paragraphs (b), (c) or (d). could be construed to permit waiver. 
With regard to arbitrators, EC 5-20 stated 
Rule 1.13. Safekeeping Property. 
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a 
lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained 
in the state where the lawyer's office is situated or elsewhere with the consent 
of the client or third person. Other property shall be identified as such and 
appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other 
property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five 
years sifter termination of the representation. 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person 
has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. 
Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person 
any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to 
receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render 
a full accounting regarding such property. 
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of prop-
erty In which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the prop-
erty shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and 
severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective 
interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the 
dispute is resolved. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1074 
concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-
lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may 
have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or 
whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various re-
spects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in 
state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of 
other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these 
officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in intra-
governmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer 
could not represent multiple private clients. They also may have authority to 
represent the "public interest" in circumstances where a private lawyer would 
not be authorized to do so. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority. 
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a 
basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that disci-
plinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts 
and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and 
in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or 
incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that 
whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation and the severity of 
a sanction depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seri-
ousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been 
previous violations. Disciplinary action shall be governed by the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, and the burden of proof shall be on the State 
Bar to sustain any allegation of violation by clear and convincng evidence. 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action, ogrjghould it 
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. TheRules are 
designed to provide guidance to lawyers ai^JjLproAlde-a^tiaictur e for regulat-
ing conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis 
for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be" subverted 
when they arftJnvoked by opposing parties ag_pi££gdural weap ^ ns. The fact 
that a Rule is a justbasis for a lawyer's self-assessment or for {'auctioning a 
lawyefUnder the administration of a disciplinary-AUthorita-does not imply 
that an lintagoniBt in a collateral prQceedingLQrJ;ransaction han standing to 
seek enforcement of_the Rule, Accordingly, nothing in_theJftul€L-fihauld__be 
deemed to augment any substantive legaljli^x_gflawy,erj3 jaiLthj^^aidisci-
plinary consequences of violating such a duty. 
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial applica-
tion of either the client-lawyer or work product privilege. Tho3e privileges 
were developed to promote compliance with law and fairness in litigation. In 
reliance on the client-lawyer privilege, clients are entitled to expect that 
communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected against 
compelled disclosure. The client-lawyer privilege is that of the client and not 
of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the 
Rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate 
the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expecta-
tion that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed 
and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in 
accordance with the recognized exceptions to the client-lawyer and work prod-
uct privileges. 
The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule 
1.6 should not be Bubject to reexamination. Permitting such reexamination 
would be incompatible with the general policy of promoting compliance with 
law through assurances that communications will be protected against disclo-
sure. 
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the mean-
ing and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide 
general orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, 
but the text of each Rule is authoritative. Research notes were prepared to 
1U73 RULES OF FKOFE5SIONAL UUINDUUT 
An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving govern-
ment under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a 
profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to 
practice. 
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibili-
ties of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its 
regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of 
parochial or self-interested concerns of the Bar. Every lawyer is responsible 
for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid 
in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibili-
ties compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest 
which it serves. 
Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of 
this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our 
legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve 
to define that relationship. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Professional Stan-
dards Versus Personal Ethics: The Lawyer's 
Dilemma, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 1. 
SCOPE 
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be inter-
preted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law 
itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall' or "shall 
not." These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. 
Others, generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and de !ine areas 
under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. No disciplin-
ary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or a:ts within 
the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships 
between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and 
disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a law-
yer's professional role. Many of the Comments use the term "should." Com-
ments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing 
in compliance with the Rules. 
The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That 
context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licennure, laws 
defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in 
general. Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, de-
pends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily 
upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, 
upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, how-
ever, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a law-
yer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal 
rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. 
Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and re-
sponsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine 
whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from 
the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested that 
the lawyer render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there 
are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that may 
attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relation-
ship shall be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any 
specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of 
fact. 
Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and com-
mon law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority 
Spine Institute of Utah 
BfitAN BURNS. O.C. ROOTffllffiN 
RE: MEDICAL REPORTS AND DOCTOR'S LIEN 
I do hurtbv authorize SPINE INSTITUTE to furnish you, my attorney, with a full 
report of examination, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, etc., of myself in regarc to the accident which I 
was recently involved. 
I hereby authorize end direct you, my attorney, tc pay directly to said clinic such sums es may bo duo ond 
owing to?* medical service rendered me both by reason of this accident end by raason of any other bills that 
ere due the clinic end to withhold such Bums from any settlement, judgment or verdict es may be 
necessary to adeausteiy protect said clinic. And I hereby further g»ve a Hen on my case to said clm»c 
against eny and all proceeds of my settlement, judgment or verdict which may be paid tc you, my attorney, 
or myself, as the result of the Injuries for which I have been treated o< injuries m connection therewith. 
I agree never to rescind tins document and that a rescission will nor be honored by my attorney. I hereby 
instruct that in the event another attorney is substituted in this matter, the new attorney honor this lien es 
inherent to the settlement and enforceable upon the case es if i: were; executed by him. 
I fully understand max I ?rn directly end fully responsible to Mid clinic for oil medical bills submitted for 
service renaered me anc the: this agreement is made soley (or said clinic's additional protection and in 
consideration of awaiting payment. And I further understand that such payment <s not contingent on any 
settlement, judgment or verdict by wh»ch I may eventually recover sale fee. 
Please acknowledge this letter by .signing below end returning to the Spine Institute I have been advised 
that tf my attorney does net wish to cooperate m protecting the clinic's interest, the clinic will not await 
payment but will reauire rne to make payments on a-current ba s^> * \ * k n 
Dated 5 / / J-J\> Patient's Signature 
The undersigned being attorney of record for the above^tient ooes hereby agree to ooserve a!! the terms 
of the above and agree.1; tc withhold Such cums from any settlement, judgment, or verdict 8$ may be 
necess8rv to adequately protect said clinic above-named. 
^uJtJLj J *^ 
DtedljjLU ?ty Attorney's *«?»««* <s£*>*^r / * ^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ " ^ 
Please sign, date, and return one copy to Spin© Institute. Also keep one copy for your records. 
i: on PCt. i a n w l UntSD 
*-<" nut i. D. 
650 East 4500 South. Suite 300 Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 (801) 265-2700 
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compare counterparts in the Code of Professional Responsibility (approved by 
the Utah Supreme Court February 19, 1971) and to provide selected refer-
ences to other authorities. The notes have not been adopted, do not constitute 
part of the Rules and are not intended to affect the application or interpreta-
tion of the Rules and Comments. 
TERMINOLOGY 
"Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed 
the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circum-
stances. 
"Consult" or "consultation" denotes cortimunication of information reason-
ably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter 
in question. 
"Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers 
employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and 
lawyers employed in a legal services organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10. 
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and 
not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of rele-
vant information. 
"Knowingly," "known" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in 
question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. 
'Tartner" denotes a member of a partnership and a shareholder in a law 
firm organized as a professional corporation. 
"Reasonable" or "reasonably," when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer, 
denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. 
"Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a 
lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the 
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable. 
"Reasonably should know," when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that 
a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter 
in question. 
"Substantial," when used in reference to degree or extent, denotes a mate-
rial matter of clear and weighty importance. 
Client-Lawyer Relationship 
Rule 1.1. Competence. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and prepa-
ration reasonably necessary for the representation. 
COMMENT 
Legal Knowledge and Skill 
In determining whether a lawyer employs 
the requisite knowledge and skill in a particu-
lar matter, relevant factors include the rela-
tive complexity and specialized nature of the 
matter, the lawyer's general experience, the 
lawyer's training and experience in the field in 
question, the preparation and study the lawyer 
is able to give the matter and whether it is 
feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or 
consult with, a lawyer of established compe-
tence in the field in question. In many in-
stances, the required proficiency is that of a 
general practitioner. Expertise in a particular 
field of law may be required in some circum-
stances. 
A lawyer need not necessarily have special 
training or prior experience to handle legal 
problems of a type with which the lawyer is 
unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as 
competent as a practitioner with long experi-
ence. Some important legal skills, such as the 
analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evi-
dence and legal drafting, are required in all 
legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental 
legal skill consists of determining what kind of 
legal problems a situation may involve, a skiU 
that necessarily transcends any particular spe-
cialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide ade-
quate representation in a wholly novel field 
through necessary study. Competent represen-
tation can also be provided through the associ-
ation of a lawyer of established competence in 
the field in question. 
In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or 
assistance in a matter in which the lawyer 
does not have the skill ordinarily required 
where referral to or consultation or association 
DATED t h i s 2SL cay of Sep tember , 
By t h e / C o u r t s 
Robin\Wc>Ree^e, Judge 
x&-- • 
MAILING CERTIFICATED^., 
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, this (£? 
day of September, 1995: 
Victor Lawrence 
Att ^ rney at Law 
10 West Broadway, Suite 311 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-6686 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BRIAN D. BURNS D.C. d/b/a : 
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, : JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and : Civil No. #30004651 CV 
VICTOR LAWRENCE 
Judge Jtee^e 
Defendants. : 
The above-entitled matter c^ue on regularly before the 
Honorable Judge Robin W. Reece pursuant to the trial had in this 
matter, the Court having reviewed the files and records herein, 
having received the testimony of the witnesses, having received the 
arguments of counsel, having reviewed the legal authority 
presented, and for good cause appearing, therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be 
entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of 
$2,060.00, plus prejudgment interest of $858.33, plus costs of 
$74.00, for a total judgment of $2,992.33, plus post-judgment 
interest to accrue at the legal rate of 9.22 percent per annum. 
v . - -> 
settled. Mr. Summerhays negotiated that settlement with the 
insurance company and instructed the insurance company to make a 
check payable to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward. 
5. In September, 1991, Mr. Lawrence initiated a call to Mr. 
Summerhays. Mr. Summerhays and Mr. Lawrence discussed the value of 
the personal injury claim of Mr. Ward. Mr. Summerhays told Mr. 
Lawrence that Dr. Burns had a lien against the settlement proceeds 
and informed Mr. Lawrence of Mr. Summerhays' attorney's fees. 
6. In December, 1991, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Summerhays, and Mr. 
Ward met in Lawrence's office. The meeting was arranged by Mr. 
Summerhays. At that meeting, Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward endorsed 
the settlement check. 
7. Mr. Summerhays instructed Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Ward to 
endorse the settlement check and instructed Mr. Lawrence to deposit 
that check. After the check cleared, Mr. Summerhays instructed Mr. 
Lawrence to distribute the proceeds of the settlement, 3 8 percent 
to Mr. Summerhays and the balance to Mr. Ward. 
8. The insurance check was issued as full settlement of the 
personal injury claim of Mr. Ward. 
9. In compliance with the instructions of Mr. Summerhays, Mr. 
Lawrence deposited the checks into his trust account and 
distributed the sums to Mr. Ward and Mr. Summerhays. 
10. Dr. Burns has never been paid on the lien or claim which 
he had against the proceeds of the personal injury action of Mr. 
Ward. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. When Mr. Lawrence endorsed the settlement check, deposited 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-6686 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BRIAN D. BURNS D.C. d/b/a 
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS and 
VICTOR LAWRENCE 
Defendants. 
AMENDFD FINDING'S OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil $o. 930004651 CV 
: Judge Reece 
The above-entitled matter catme on regularly before the 
Honorable Judge Robin W. Reece pursuant to the trial setting in the 
above-entitled matter. Testimony was received by the Court on May 
15, 1995, and again on August 15, 1995. The court having reviewed 
the files and records herein, having received the testimony of the 
witnesses, having received the arguments of counsel and for good 
cause appearing, therefore does hereby issue the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Dr. Burns treated John Ward in May of 1990. 
2. To insure payment, Dr. Burns received an assignment of 
benefits and a doctor's lien from Mr. Ward. 
3. The lien was signed by Mr. Ward and by Mr. Summerhays or 
some member of Mr. Summerhays' office staff. 
4. Late in 1991, the personal injury action o^  Mr. Ward was 
Oj! |Au,s 
• »%C
 u 
DATED t h 
•y\S. OF u'r'/... 
i s /_> day of O c t o b e r ,—199 5%, ''A 
UBy:the .Courts : >l i _ 
W \& 
NX V 
Robi%^jti^.e^e, Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Victor Lawrence, 10 West Broadway Suite 311, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, this day of 
October, 1995. 
it in his trust account, and disbursed the proceeds of the personal 
injury settlement, he engaged in legal representation of Mr. Ward. 
2. Mr. Lawrence had a legal duty to third parties in relation 
to the proceeds of the personal injury action. These duties 
include: 
a. That he exercise due diligence to discover and 
satisfy third-party claims on the proceeds from the personal injury 
action. 
b. That he disburse portions of the personal injury 
recovery to third parties to satisfy their claims or to hold those 
sums in trust in the event the third-party claims were disputed. 
3. Mr. Lawrence breached this duty by disbursing the proceeds 
of the Ward personal injury action to Mr. Summerhays and Mr. Ward 
and failing to discover the claims of third parties on the personal 
injury proceeds when he had actual notice of the claim and lien of 
Dr. Burns. 
4. Mr. Lawrence received no remuneration for his legal 
services provided to Mr. Ward in relation to the proceeds from the 
personal injury action. However, this lack of remuneration has no 
bearing on or affect on damages. 
5. Mr. Lawrence is liable to Dr. Burns for his lien in the 
amount of $2,060.00, plus prejudgment interest from June 27, 1991 
until the entry of this judgment, in the amount of $858.33 through 
August 27, 1995, plus costs in the amount of $74.00, for a total 
judgment of $2,992.33, and post-judgment interest to accrue at the 
legal rate of 9.22 percent per annum. 
